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This paper examines the hypothesis that the persistence of low spatial and marital mobility in rural
India, despite increased growth rates and rising inequality in recent years, is due to the existence of
sub-caste networks that provide mutual insurance to their members. Unique panel data providing information
on income, assets, gifts, loans, consumption, marriage, and migration are used to link caste networks
to household and aggregate mobility. Our key finding, consistent with the hypothesis that local risk-sharing
networks restrict mobility, is that among households with the same (permanent) income, those in higher-income
caste networks are more likely to participate in caste-based insurance arrangements and are less likely
to both out-marry and out-migrate. At the aggregate level, the networks appear to have coped successfully
with the rising inequality within sub-castes that accompanied the Green Revolution. The results suggest
that caste networks will continue to smooth consumption in rural India for the foreseeable future, as
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Increased mobility is the hallmark of a developing economy. Although individuals might be tied to
the land they are born on and the occupations that they inherit from their parents in a traditional
economy, the emergence of the market allows individuals to seek out jobs and locations that are best
suited to their talents and abilities. Among developing countries, India stands out for its remarkably
low levels of occupational and spatial mobility. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), for example, show how
caste-based labor market networks have locked entire groups of individuals into narrow occupational
categories for generations. India lags behind other countries with similar size and levels of economic
development in terms of spatial mobility as well.1 Figure 1 plots the percent of the adult population
living in the city, and the change in this percentage over the 1975-2000 period, for four large developing
countries: Indonesia, China, India, and Nigeria (UNDP 2002). Urbanization in all four countries was
low to begin with in 1975 but India falls far behind the rest by 2000. Deshingkar and Anderson (2004)
show that rates of urbanization in India are lower, by one full percentage point, than countries with
similar levels of urbanization, and that the fraction of the population that is urban in India is 15
percent lower than in countries with comparable GDP per-capita.
Data from the Indian census indicates that just one-fth of the growth in the urban population
from 1991 to 2001, which we have seen is relatively low, can be attributed to migration. Indeed,
permanent migration of all types - including rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban - has remained low
despite the restructuring of the Indian economy during the 1990's. The proportion of individuals in
the population that changed residence in the decade preceding the 1991 and 2001 census rounds was
roughly constant, and among these migrants less than a third were men seeking jobs. Consistent with
these national trends, a sample of Indian households drawn from all the major states in the country
that we use for much of the analysis in this paper indicates that in rural areas permanent migration
rates of men out of their origin villages were as low as 8.7 percent in 1999.2 Indeed, it is standard
1By spatial mobility we mean a permanent change in residence. Recent evidence indicates that temporary or circular
migration - one or more members of a household temporarily moves to an area for work purposes while other family
members remain in the same village - has increased in India (Deshingkar and Anderson, 2004), although there are no
national statistics on this phenomenon.
2This statistic refers to men aged 20-30 in 1999 who had left their rural residences ve or more years ago. Women
have traditionally migrated outside the village to marry in India. In our data, of the rural women marrying between
1982 and 1999, more than 88 percent had left their origin village by 1999, and marriage is almost always the reason for
this exit. Along these lines, the 2001 census indicates that movement due to marriage accounts for roughly 45 percent of
all permanent migration in India, while employment, business, and the movement of entire families accounts for just 39
percent of migration (similar statistics are obtained in the 1991 round). We will consequently focus on male out-migration
when measuring spatial mobility in this paper.
1practice for researchers to ignore out-migration in empirical studies based in rural India, although a
coherent explanation for such immobility rooted in the fundamental features of the local economy is
lacking.3
Low rates of out-migration are not the only indicators of immobility in India. The basic marriage
rule in Hindu society is that no individual is permitted to marry outside the sub-caste or jati. Social
mobility will be severely restricted by this rule because individuals are forced to match within a very
narrow pool. Social mobility, as measured by inter-caste marriage, continues to be low in rural India
despite the economic changes within and across castes that have taken place over the past decades.
Recent surveys in rural and urban India that the authors have conducted indicate that among 25-40
year olds, out-marriage was 7.6% in Mumbai in 2001, 6.2% in South Indian tea plantations in 2003,
and 5.8% for the rural Indian population in 16 major states of India in 1999.4
Why is mobility in India so low? Many explanations for this phenomenon are possible; for example,
one explanation for the low rural-urban migration in India in the 1970's and 1980's is that opportunities
in the rural areas expanded with the increase in agricultural productivity that accompanied the Green
Revolution, and so the push that drives migration in other economies may have been absent. However,
the productivity increases associated with the initial stages of the Indian Green Revolution were not
spread evenly across India, increasing disparities in rural wage rates and thus the gains from rural-
to-rural migration. Moreover, over the past 15 years or more Indian growth rates, inclusive of the
non-agricultural sector, have been high by any standard and male migration and out-marriage continue
to be low, at least in rural areas. Similarly, it could be argued that individuals continue to marry
within their jatis simply because they have a strong preference for partners with the same background
and characteristics. However, this cannot explain why out-marriage has not increased despite the
increase in within-jati inequality that we document below.
The particular (unied) explanation for both low out-marriage and low out-migration that we pro-
pose in this paper is that rural jati-based networks, which have been active in smoothing consumption
for centuries in the absence of well functioning markets, restrict mobility. Marriage ties increase social
3The assumption that the rural population is essentially immobile has been made in studies of local governance in
rural India (Banerjee et al., 2005), the determinants of rural schooling (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995), and trade between
castes (Anderson, 2005).
4The statistic for Mumbai is based on the parents and the siblings of the sampled school children who were aged 25-40.
The statistic for the South Indian tea plantations is based on those workers and their children who were in the same
age-range. And the statistic for rural India is drawn from a representative sample of rural Indian households, surveyed
in 1982 and 1999, that we use for much of the analysis in this paper. This statistic is computed using the siblings and
the children of household heads in 1982 who were aged 25-40 in 1999.
2interactions within a jati and so exclusion from these interactions serves as a natural mechanism to
sustain cooperative behavior. Once households out-marry or out-migrate, these interactions will be
less frequent and less important, resulting in a commensurate decline in the network's ability to punish.
A standard result from the repeated games literature is that if punishments are set to zero and indi-
viduals are suciently impatient, cooperation cannot be sustained. If this were applicable to our rural
Indian setting, then each household would be faced with two choices: (i) participate in the network but
then forego the additional utility that comes with mobility, or (ii) out-marry and out-migrate at the
cost of losing the services of the network. Without access to alternative consumption-smoothing ar-
rangements of comparable quality, most households appear to have historically chosen the rst option
and continue to do so today.5
We use in this paper newly-available survey data describing the population of rural India over
the past three decades that identies the jatis of household heads, their spouses and their immediate
relatives and provides detailed information on loans and gifts to (i) examine the hypothesis that caste
networks providing mutual insurance play an important role in limiting mobility and (ii) assess the
prospects for both the decay of these networks and for increased mobility as economic growth proceeds.
A direct test of the hypothesis that rural households forego mobility in return for superior insurance is
that those who leave networks are less insured. However, any attempt to estimate the loss of insurance
due to out-marriage or out-migration must take account of the fact that both insurance and mobility
are endogenously determined. In our view there are no credible instruments for marriage or migration
that would identify their eects on insurability. Our strategy instead is to exploit the permanent
increase in income inequality within jatis that accompanied the agricultural Green Revolution. The
model that we describe below identies households that would be most likely to leave the mutual
insurance arrangement in the aftermath of this technological change as well as the jatis that would be
most vulnerable to such exit. We then proceed to show that it is precisely those households and the
members of those vulnerable jatis that are observed to have the greatest rates of out-marriage and
out-migration.
We begin the analysis in this paper by establishing the importance of caste-based insurance net-
works in Section 2. Using data from the 1982 and 1999 rounds of the national rural survey that we use
5The argument that mobility is accompanied by a loss in network services applies to unilateral moves. If a suciently
large subset of the jati moves to the city, for example, it may still be possible to maintain traditional network ties.
Consistent with this view, historical and contemporary evidence suggests that occupational and spatial migration in India,
although infrequent, occurred and continues to occur under the auspices of the jati (Chandravarkar 1985, Damodaran
2008).
3for much of the analysis, we show that nearly one-quarter of the households in the sample participated
in the insurance arrangement in the year prior to each survey round, giving or receiving transfers.
These transfers can be broadly classied into gifts and loans, and although loans account for just 20
percent of all within-caste transactions by value, they are more important than bank loans or mon-
eylender loans in smoothing consumption and in particular for meeting contingencies such as illness
and marriage that impose infrequent but very large costs. We also show that caste loans are received
on more favorable terms, with respect to both interest rates and collateral requirements, than alterna-
tive sources of nance. There is a large literature on credit markets in developing countries that has
primarily focused on the interaction between traditional local moneylenders and formal banks. More
recently, attention has shifted to micro-nance arrangements. This literature, however, has ignored
informal caste-based loans, which we will see are an important source of credit in rural India.
How well do these caste networks function? Based on Townsend's (1994) work in rural India,
many studies have implemented a test of full risk-sharing in which a key implication is that house-
hold consumption should be completely determined by aggregate consumption in the group around
which the mutual insurance is organized and, in addition, should be independent of transitory income
shocks. Although individuals may receive loans from moneylenders, employers, and other individuals
outside their jati with whom they have established close bilateral relations, the interactions that are
needed to support collective punishments and sustain cooperative behavior at the level of the group
occur predominantly within jatis. Previous contributions to the risk-sharing literature that are situ-
ated in rural India have treated the village as the social unit, whereas we argue instead that the jati,
which extends beyond village boundaries, is the relevant unit around which the insurance network
is organized.6 Section 3 of the paper reports results from Townsend's test of full risk-sharing, using
a national panel sample of rural households over a three-year period, 1969-71 to assess if household
consumption co-moves strongly with aggregate jati consumption. An extremely high degree of con-
sumption smoothing is sustained at the level of the jati, although we formally reject full risk-sharing,
matching the results from many previous studies (see, for example, Townsend 1994, Grimard 1997,
Ligon 1998, and Fafchamps and Lund 2000). Additional robustness tests that control for consump-
tion outside the jati in the village, and study the co-movement of household consumption with jati
6An exception is Morduch (2004) who considers sub-caste groupings within villages as mutual-insurance networks.
Given the data used, however, he could not implement the robustness checks reported below, which exploit the fact that
caste networks extend beyond the village. Grimard (1997) using data from Cote d'Ivoire shows that risk-sharing extends
beyond the boundaries of the village and is carried out among spatially-spread households within ethnic lineages. He
also presents descriptive evidence that migration patterns are inhibited by ethnic ties.
4consumption outside the village, reinforce the claim that the jati is the appropriate domain of the
insurance network.
Having established the importance of caste networks and their role in smoothing consumption,
we next assess within the context of a model the eect of a permanent increase in income inequality
within the jati on the stability of the insurance arrangement, with accompanying implications for
out-marriage and out-migration. The model that we develop in Section 4 is solved in two steps: In
the rst step, we solve for the expected surplus from participating in the network over autarky for
each household. This step closely follows Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, except that households that
deviate from the cooperative arrangement receive a boost to their utility from mobility in autarky.
Having computed the surpluses in the rst step, households decide whether or not to participate in
the insurance arrangement in the second step.
Given the punishments that are in place, consumption-smoothing transfers will be set so that no
household ever deviates from the cooperative arrangement and exits ex post, once it has chosen to
participate. However, a household that stays out of the arrangement to begin with can out-marry
and out-migrate without punishment. It follows that the expected surplus could be negative ex ante
(in step 2) if the benets of the insurance arrangement are dominated by the gains from mobility.
The main result of the model is that conditional on the household's income, a permanent increase
in the rest of the network's income following an unexpected technological change will increase its ex
ante surplus under plausible conditions. If households that traditionally participated in the mutual
insurance arrangement are allowed to reconsider their decision following the technological change,
this implies that households in relatively wealthy jatis will be more likely to continue to participate.
Holding incomes constant in the rest of the network, an increase in the household's own income will
have the opposite eect on its participation. More importantly for the key hypothesis of this paper,
these permanent changes in income should have the opposite eect on mobility.
To test the predictions of the model, we need a source of exogenous variation in income inequality
within the jati that is uncorrelated with factors, such as access to credit or public amenities in the
village, that might directly aect participation in the mutual insurance arrangement or mobility. For
this purpose, we exploit two features of the Indian Green Revolution: First, the returns to the new
High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) were much greater on irrigated land. Second, only certain parts of the
country had access to this superior technology at the onset of the Green Revolution in the late 1960's.
Although cross-breeding with local varieties ultimately allowed the new technology to be adopted
5throughout the country, those areas that had a head start ended up with a dierent income trajectory
than those that followed, particularly those areas with pre-existing irrigation capacities. This spatial
variation in income in the aftermath of the Green Revolution increased inequality within historically
homogeneous jatis, which typically span a wide area. Indeed, comparison of Gini coecients of the
rural income distribution in 1982 and 1999, as presented in Figure 2, indicate that within-jati inequality
rose by 42 percent over this period. In contrast, within-village inequality rose by 30 percent over the
same time-period.7
In Section 5 of the paper we estimate the eect of permanent changes in income between 1982 and
1999, for a panel of households and their jatis, on participation in the mutual insurance arrangement
and mobility. Following the discussion above, the instruments for the change in income are restricted
to the interaction of the share of irrigated land in the village in 1971 and access to the new HYV
technology in that year, land area inherited by the household head, and the triple interaction of these
variables. Our identication strategy allows for the possibility that access to HYV seeds in the village
in 1971 at the onset of the Green Revolution and irrigation in that year are endogenously determined,
reecting unobserved variation in local credit access and governance capability. Exploiting the comple-
mentarity between irrigation and the new HYV technology, only the coincidental interaction of these
variables, scaled up by inherited land area, is used to predict changes in income. The instrumental
variable estimates match well with the predictions of the model and are robust to the incorporation
of variables reecting local changes in public amenities and credit facilities. In particular, we nd
that conditional on changes in the household's own income, an increase in the rest of the jati's income
increases participation in the insurance arrangement and decreases the probability that the household
will out-marry and out-migrate. These results are dicult to reconcile with alternative explanations
that do not involve the jati network but are a natural consequence of the tension between network
participation and mobility that arises in our framework.
Apart from establishing a link between caste networks and household mobility, the analysis also
connects network viability and income inequality to aggregate growth and mobility. The empirical
results indicate that when caste networks are active, permanent increases in income brought about
by economic growth, with no accompanying increase in within-network inequality, have little eect
on mobility. The theoretical model tells us that what matters for changes in mobility is not even
7The 1982 and 1999 Gini coecients are statistically signicantly dierent at the 5 percent level, both for the jati
and the village.
6(exogenous) changes in inequality in the general population, but rather inequality within the jati. Our
estimates indicate that a relative decline in the rest of the jati's income does increase the household's
propensity to out-marry and out-migrate, although the magnitude of this eect turns out to be quite
small. Although low mobility has negative implications for growth, the resilience of the caste networks
in the face of substantial increases in inequality suggests that they will continue to smooth consumption
in rural India in the foreseeable future, as they have for centuries, unless alternative market mechanisms
of comparable quality become available.
2 Sources of Financial Support in Rural India
In this section we show that transfers from caste members are important and preferred mechanisms
through which consumption is smoothed in rural India. Much of the evidence is based on a panel
survey of rural Indian households conducted in 1982 and 1999. The baseline survey is the 1982 Rural
Economic Development Survey (REDS) carried out by the National Council of Applied Economic
Research (NCAER) in 1981-82 in 259 villages located in 16 states (the major states except Assam).8
The sample of 4,979 households is meant to be representative of all rural households in those states.
Subsequently, all households in the 1982 survey (with the exception of those residing in Jammu
and Kashmir) in which at least one member remained in the village were resurveyed in 1999. In
addition, in that year a random sample of households was also added so that the the sample retains
its representativeness.
Both surveys report caste transfers, which include gift amounts sent and received as well as loans
originating from or provided to fellow jati members. Table 1 reports the percentage of households
in the two survey rounds who gave or received caste transfers in the year prior to each survey. The
table shows that even in a single year, participation in the caste-based insurance arrangement is high
- 25 percent of the households in the 1982 survey and 20 percent in the 1999 round.9 Although some
caste-based transfers may be used for purposes other than consumption-smoothing, we show below
that the caste network plays an especially important role in meeting contingencies such as illness and
marriage that impose infrequent but very large costs. We would expect multiple households to support
the receiving household when such events do occur and consistent with this view, sending households
8The 16 states include Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Orissa, Punjab, Rajastan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.
9The statistics in Table 1 are weighted using sample weights and thus are population statistics.
7contribute 5-7 percent of their annual income on average whereas the corresponding statistic for
receiving households is 20-40 percent. Some of these dierences arise because sending households have
higher income on average than receiving households, indicative of redistribution within the the jati
that will play an important role in the discussion that follows. Nevertheless, it is easy to verify that
the amount sent per household is less than the amount received, although the share of households
that gave transfers is not substantially greater than the share that received transfers, suggesting that
out-ows may be under-reported.10
A key feature of both surveys is that information on source and purpose is provided for every loan
that was outstanding at the beginning of the reference period or obtained during the reference period.
Although the 1982 and 1999 survey instruments were designed for the most part to permit analysis
across the two time periods, some sections did not coincide precisely. For example, the classication
of activities that loans are used for is much coarser in 1999 and, in particular, consumption expenses
do not appear as a separate category. Because an important role of the caste networks is to smooth
consumption, we restrict our description of loans by source and by purpose to the 1982 survey.
The 1982 survey data indicate that although banks are the dominant source of credit, accounting
for 64.6 percent of all loans in value, caste members are the dominant source of informal loans, making
up 13.9 percent of the total value of loans received by households in the year prior to the survey. This
is more than the amount households obtained from moneylenders (7.9 percent), friends (7.8 percent),
and employers (5.6 percent). Table 2 reports the proportion of loans in value terms both by source
and purpose. As can be seen, caste loans are disproportionately used to cover consumption expenses
and for meeting contingencies such as illness and marriage. For example, although loans from caste
members were 14 percent of all loans in value, they were 23 and 43 percent, respectively, of the value
of all consumption and contingency loans.11 In contrast, bank loans are by far the dominant source
of nance for investment and operating expenses, but account for just 25 percent and 28 percent of
loans received for consumption expenses and contingencies.
10An important empirical prediction of our model is that conditional on the household's income, an increase in the
rest of the jati's income should increase its participation in the caste-based insurance arrangement. Under-reporting of
outows will only bias our estimates if the change in the mismatch between in-ows and out-ows over time is correlated
with the change in jati income relative to the household's income. There is no obvious reason why this should be the
case.
11Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1986) surveyed nine villages in South India after a two-year drought and found that
nearly half (46%) of the sampled households had taken consumption loans during the drought. The sources of these
loans (by value) were government banks (18%), moneylenders, landlord, employer (28%), relatives and members of the
same caste community (54%), emphasizing the importance of caste loans for smoothing consumption.
8Are the statistics in Table 2, representing the rural population of India in 1982, comparable to
the current period? Columns 6-10 of Table 2 describe loans by source and purpose using the 2005
India Human Development Survey (IHDS). This survey, conducted on a representative sample of rural
households throughout the country, reports loans received over the ve years preceding the survey by
source. Unfortunately the survey does not use caste-group as a category, although it does identify
loans from relatives, which we will assume are within-caste loans. Some interest bearing loans received
from caste members will undoubtedly have been listed in the \Moneylender" category and other loans
may have been misclassied in the \Other" category, inating the value of loans received from those
sources at the expense of the \Caste" category. Nevertheless, the basic patterns reported from the
1982 survey round in Columns 1-5 remain unchanged. Caste loans, or more correctly loans from
relatives, make up 9 percent of all loans by value, more than both friends and employers. Bank loans
are less important in the IHDS than in the 1982 REDS survey, but this may simply reect dierences
in reporting; notice that the \Moneylender" and \Other" categories account for a disproportionate
share of total loans by value.12 Looking across purposes, we see once again that informal caste loans
are most useful in smoothing consumption and meeting contingencies. Moneylender loans are also
extremely important for these purposes, although as discussed some of this may reect misclassied
caste loans; as seen below in Table 3 over 70 percent of caste-based loans in the 1982 survey charged
interest. Overall, lending patterns have remained fairly constant over the two decades covered in Table
2.13
We argue in this paper that caste networks restrict mobility because comparable arrangements are
unavailable, particularly for smoothing consumption and meeting contingencies. Table 3 shows that
loan terms - the proportion of zero-interest loans, the proportion of loans not requiring collateral, and
the proportion of loans not requiring interest or collateral - are substantially more favorable for caste
loans on average. It is quite striking that of the caste loans received in the year prior to the 1982
survey, 20 percent by value required no interest payment and no collateral. The corresponding statistic
for the alternative sources of credit was close to zero, except for loans from friends where 4 percent
of the loans were received on similarly favorable terms. The IHDS does not provide information on
12NGO's and credit groups, which have received a great deal of attention in the economics literature in recent years
are also included in the \Other" category. However, these sources together account for less than 2.1 percent of all loans
by value received by rural households.
13The ICRISAT VLS data is another source of information on loan providers, with one source category listed as \fellow
caste member". However, in that survey informal loans charging interest, no matter what their source, were classied as
from a \moneylender" (Singh et al., 1985).
9collateral but does report whether a loan was interest-free. We see in Table 3, Column 5 that caste
(extended family) loans are substantially more likely to be interest-free than loans from other sources,
matching the corresponding statistics from the 1982 REDS survey in Column 1.14
Tables 2 and 3 establish that loans from caste members are important for smoothing consumption
and meeting contingencies that make large expenditure demands, and continue to be advantageous to
borrowers compared with loans from major alternative sources of nance in rural India. A variety of
nancial instruments ranging from gifts to loans with varying interest and collateral requirements are
used to smooth consumption within the caste, and it is important to reiterate that caste loans, despite
their importance, account for just 23 percent of all within-caste transfers by value. The analysis that
follows will formally test the eciency of caste networks with their associated transfers in smoothing
consumption.
3 Caste Networks and Consumption Smoothing
In his study of risk and insurance in village India, Townsend (1994) derives a simple test to assess
whether households are fully insured. The set of Pareto-optimal consumption allocations with full













where  2 [0;1) is a common discount factor, st is the probability of state s occurring in period
t, i is household i's welfare weight, and cs
it is its consumption allocation in state s and period t,







it. The innitely lived, risk-averse household's utility function ui(cs
it) has the
usual properties and the implicit assumption underlying the resource constraint is that there is no
storage and no savings.
Combining the rst-order conditions obtained for any two households i and j from this constrained











14We also carried out analysis-of-variance tests of whether the incidence of collateral requirements and zero interest
rates were statistically signicantly dierent by loan source controlling for loan purpose, with and without loan-size
weighting. The results, available from the authors, indicate that, as in the Table 3, caste loans are signicantly less likely
to charge interest and require collateral compared with loans from any other source.
10The ratio of marginal utilities for any two households will be constant in each time period for any
state of nature. Assuming common CRRA preferences across all households, taking logs, summing
over any subset of households j = f1;:::;Jg, j 6= i, and then dividing by J, the number of households























where  is the coecient of relative risk aversion. This condition should hold in each time period,
in any state of nature, and so Townsend's test of full risk-sharing can be easily implemented if panel
data over successive years are available:












j=1 log(cjt) measures average log-consumption in the relevant subset of the network
and the additional variable that is introduced, log(yit), measures the household's income in period
t. The household xed eect fi collects all the terms in square brackets in equation (1). With full
risk-sharing, the household's consumption in any state of the world will be determined by aggregate
consumption ( > 0), but will be independent of its income ( = 0). For the special case with CRRA
preferences,  = 1 as in equation (1).
To implement Townsend's test at the level of the jati, we need information on each household's
jati aliation. The 1982 and 1999 REDS surveys followed an earlier three-year longitudinal survey,
also conducted by the NCAER, over the 1969-71 period. This survey covered 4,118 households in the
17 major states of India and was designed to be representative of the entire rural population of the
country in those years. The 1982 survey built on the longitudinal study, adding households where
necessary to construct a sample that was representative of the rural population at that later time,
while the 1999 survey attempted to track all households in the 1982 round, including those that had
partitioned. Detailed jati information was not collected in the 1969-71 survey or the 1982 follow-up,
but this deciency was rectied in the 1999 survey round. It is consequently possible to assign jatis to
those households in the 1969-71 panel who were re-surveyed in 1982 and subsequently in 1999. The
test of full-risk sharing, over the 1969-71 period, is consequently restricted to the 1,798 households
for which jati aliation is available. The subset of households with jati information is not a random
11sample of the 1969-71 households. However, all time-invariant household characteristics (including the
welfare weight) are subsumed in the household xed eect when implementing the Townsend test.15
When the caste system was rst established many centuries ago, individuals born into a jati were
locked into the traditional occupation assigned to it over their lifetimes. These restrictions on occu-
pational mobility gradually weakened over time and today some degree of occupational heterogeneity
will exist in any jati. What maintains the jati's salience (and its ability to support networks serving
many dierent roles) is the rule of marital endogamy, which we have noted continues to be maintained.
What is the appropriate geographical domain in which intra-jati marriages occur? If we take the
idea that each jati was originally dened by an occupation seriously, then a jati could potentially
span the entire country. This is not the case in practice, however, because India's many languages
create natural social and spatial boundaries. For example, consider the case of the Patils, a cultivator
caste from the Marathi-speaking part of the country, and the Patels, also a cultivator caste, but from
the adjacent Gujarati-speaking area. The Patils and the Patels have the same traditional occupation
and hold comparable positions in the caste hierarchy; judging from their names, these groups clearly
served the same economic role in the distant past. Nevertheless, Patils and Patels do not inter-marry,
simply because they speak dierent languages. Modern Indian states are conveniently organized along
linguistic lines and so the jati statistic that we use in the paper will be constructed within each state.
To carry out the tests of full insurance within jatis, we need to exclude households that are the only
sample representative of their jati. This reduces the sample by a small amount, to 1,687 households
(5,061 observations). Moreover, because we will carry out tests that further subdivide jati membership
by location, and for the subsequent econometric analyses we need reasonably accurate measures of jati
characteristics, we carry out most of the tests of full insurance on households that belong to jatis with
at least 10 sampled households. To assess if sample restrictions based on jati size matter, we will rst
carry out the test of full insurance on households with at least one other household from their jati in
the sample, which is the minimum criterion for inclusion. This will be followed by tests on households
with at least 10 jati representatives in the sample. It is possible, for example, that larger jatis are
15The absence of jati information is not because of non-reporting by households, but because certain 1971 household
were excluded from the 1982 and thus the 1999 survey rounds. The 1982 sample design excluded households that divided
after 1971, usually because of the death of the household head (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001). Very few households in
the 1999 survey, in which jati aliation was rst elicited, did not report their jati. As an additional robustness check,
we carried out the original Townsend-type test, treating the village as the relevant risk-sharing unit, on the samples of
households with and without caste-identity information. Estimates from the two sub-samples, available from the authors,
are virtually identical.
12more capable of providing insurance. Note, however, that the number of sampled households by jati
does not necessarily indicate which jatis are large or small, given the stratied sampling frame. In our
data the household sampling weights are actually lower for jatis with greater sample representation,
and all jati sizes appear to be sucient to meaningfully spread risk. For example, based on the sample
weights, the jati with two sample households represents 123,444 rural households.16
Table 4, Column 1 begins with the basic specication corresponding to equation (2), including
average jati consumption, net of the household's own consumption, and the household's own income
as regressors for the sample of households with at least one other jati member represented in the
data. The 1969-71 panel survey collected information on a sample of households in a sample of
villages located in the major states of the country. Jati consumption is thus computed for a subset
of households in the jati, but as shown above this does not aect the validity of the test of full risk-
sharing. The coecient on jati consumption is 0.9 and the coecient on the household's income is
0.2 in Column 1. In Column 2 we restrict the sample to households in jatis with at least 10 sample
households. The results are virtually identical, indicative once again of an extremely high degree
of consumption smoothing. However, full risk-sharing is formally rejected for both samples { the
hypothesis that the own income coecient is zero and that the jati consumption coecient is one are
both rejected at the 5 percent level. Townsend and numerous subsequent studies that have investigated
the ability of informal mutual insurance arrangements to smooth consumption in developing economies
arrive at essentially the same conclusion.
We have assumed that a typical jati spans a state. Although each major regional language is
associated with a single Indian state, multiple states are Hindi-speaking. As a robustness check, we
drop Hindi-speaking states, across which marriages could conceivably take place, in Table 4, Column
3. As can be seen, the coecients with this reduced sample of households remain very similar to what
we obtained with the full sample in Column 2. An additional concern when implementing the test
of full risk-sharing is that household incomes could be measured with error, mechanically biasing the
corresponding coecient towards zero. The co-movement of household and jati consumption could be
entirely spurious in that case, to the extent that incomes are correlated across members of the jati, with
jati-level consumption picking up aggregate shocks that inuence consumption but are incompletely
captured in measured income. The robustness check that we report in Table 4, Column 4 accounts for
this possibility by including two regressors that are potentially correlated with income shocks in the
16Because of sample stratication, all jati statistics are computed using sample weights.
13village and, hence, with measurement error in the household's income: (i) a binary variable available
in the survey data that takes the value one if there was a negative rainfall shock that adversely aected
crop production in the village, and (ii) average log consumption in the village outside the household's
jati.17 Although the coecients on both variables are precisely estimated, the own-income coecient
in Column 4 diers very little from the corresponding coecients in Columns 1-3. Moreover, household
consumption co-moves much more strongly with jati consumption than with aggregate consumption
that is outside the jati but within the village.
Table 4, Column 5 takes a dierent approach to deal with the potential measurement error problem
by constructing the consumption variable as the average of log consumption among sampled jati
members residing outside the village.18 Recall that the test of full risk-sharing can be implemented
with any subset of households in the network. The advantage of using aggregate jati consumption
outside of the village is that this variable will be mechanically uncorrelated with local (village-level)
shocks that could have biased the consumption coecient in Columns 1-3 and perhaps even in Column
4 if the additional regressors did not fully account for such shocks. We see in Column 5 that household
consumption co-moves strongly with jati consumption outside the village, although the coecient on
this measure of jati consumption is smaller than previous estimates. The coecient on the household's
own income diers very little from the corresponding coecients in Columns 1-4. One concern with the
results just reported is that weather shocks, and income shocks more generally, could extend beyond
the village, biasing the jati consumption coecient. As in Column 4, we check for this possibility by
including the average log consumption of households who are not members of the jati and who also
reside outside the village (in the same state) as an additional regressor in Column 6. Reassuringly,
the coecient on non-jati consumption is insignicant (and negative) whereas the coecients on jati
consumption and household income are largely unchanged from Column 5.
Looking across the columns in Table 4 we see that household consumption co-moves strongly
with jati consumption without exception, while the income coecient is small and stable across all
specications. These results indicate that an extremely high degree of consumption smoothing was
sustained at the level of the jati prior to the onset of the Green Revolution. It is possible that these
17The income of a household experiencing a village-level adverse weather shock is reduced by a statistically signicant
13 percent on average (xed eect estimate).
18The ICRISAT data that Townsend used to carry out his tests based on the assumption that the village was the
relevant risk-sharing entity indicate that almost 60 percent of gifts and 27 percent of loans originated outside of the
village (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Our data do not provide the location of transaction partners, but we would expect
to see a similar pattern since the domain of the jati extends far beyond the village.
14results falsely reject full insurance. Townsend (1994) notes that failing to account for preference shocks
- such as illness and marriage obligations - can lead to false rejection. Moreover, while it is standard
practice to assume that risk preferences are homogeneous, Mazzocco and Saini (2008) argue that this
assumption can also lead to conservative estimates of the degree of risk-sharing. When this assumption
is relaxed, Mazzocco and Saini demonstrate, using ICRISAT data from rural south India, that full
risk-sharing is obtained at the level of the jati but not the village. This leads them to conclude, as we
do, that the correct risk-sharing unit in rural India is the jati rather than the village. Our objective in
the analysis that follows is to study the stability of this remarkably ecient caste-based arrangement
in the face of technological change that permanently introduced income inequality within jatis.
4 The Model
The theoretical framework developed in this section is based on Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall's (2002)
model of mutual insurance with limited commitment. While Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (LTW),
Coate and Ravallion (1993), Townsend (1994), and a large literature on mutual insurance that has
followed these early studies is concerned with the extent to which transitory shocks can be smoothed,
we go beyond this literature to study the eect of a permanent increase in income for a subset of
households in the network on the continuing stability of the insurance arrangement, with implications
for out-marriage and out-migration.
4.1 Household Preferences and Income Realizations
Household preferences are Gorman aggregable, allowing the N-household insurance arrangement to
be equivalently described by a sequence of arrangements between each household, which we denote
as household 1, and the rest of the network, which we denote as household 2. Households have per-
period utility of consumption u(c1) and v(c2) respectively, and while only one household needs to be
risk averse to generate a demand for insurance we will assume that both u(c1) and v(c2) are strictly
concave to simplify the discussion that follows. Households are innitely lived, discount the future
with common discount factor , and are expected utility maximizers.
The income that each household exogenously receives in period t depends on the production
technology regime ! = fL;Hg and the state of nature s = f1;:::;Sg. There are two technology
regimes: a low-productivity (L) regime corresponding to the traditional agricultural technology in
our context, and a high-productivity (H) regime corresponding to the Green Revolution technology.
15There is a high degree of state dependence in the technology regime, with the probability of switching
regimes from one period to the next close to zero. Thus, while a household operating in a particular
regime at a given point in time is aware of the possibility that the technology could switch, it assigns
zero probability to that possibility and assumes (correctly in expectation) that the current regime will
persist forever in the future.
Within a technology regime, the state of nature follows a Markov process with the probability of
transition from state s to state r given by sr (sr > 08s;r). Suppressing the ! term to simplify
notation, regime-specic income realizations for the two households can then be expressed as y1(s),
y2(s) respectively. Later when we put structure on the change in income associated with the new
technology regime, we will assume that income increases for household 2 in all states and, hence,
permanently over time but remains unchanged for household 1: incomes in the L-regime will then be
denoted by y1(s), y2(s) and the corresponding incomes in the H-regime will be y1(s), y2(s) + y.
4.2 The Insurance Arrangement
There is no storage and no savings. Within a technology regime, the autarkic ratio of marginal
utilities is not the same across all states (in which case autarky would be rst-best). Given that both
households are risk averse, this implies that they will gain by making transfers in each state that
smooth their consumption over time. Suppressing the ! term as well as the time period t to simplify
notation once again, let s be the regime-specic transfer between household 1 and household 2 that
is used to smooth consumption when state s occurs in period t; c1(s) = y1(s)   s, c2(s) = y2(s) + s,
with s > 0 when transfers ow from household 1 to household 2 and s < 0 when the direction
of the ow is reversed. These transfers will be determined endogenously in the model and within a
given regime will depend on the history of states, the discount factor , and the punishment P that
households face when they renege on their obligations.
Following standard practice, we assume that households face a state-specic punishment P =
fP1(s);P2(s)g, in addition to being denied future access to the insurance arrangement, when they
fail to provide the promised transfer in any period. Exclusion from all social interactions, beyond
those associated with insurance provision, has been identied as an important informal punishment
mechanism in the sociology literature. This has two implications: First, in each state of nature, the
punishment level is determined by the frequency and value of current and future social interactions
and, therefore, is not a decision variable. Second, mobility will lower the ability of the network to use
16this mechanism to punish transgressions from cooperative behavior.19 Our model extends the standard
framework by introducing social and spatial mobility, measured by out-marriage and out-migration
respectively. Such mobility increases the household's per-period utility by a factor , but also reduces
the frequency and importance of its social interactions with the rest of the jati. Specically, we assume
that P = 0 for households that out-marry or out-migrate. LTW (Proposition 2) show that no non-
autarkic contracts can be sustained with P = 0 when the discount factor  lies below a threshold
level. We assume that the discount factor lies below that threshold in practice, which implies that
each household faces two choices ex ante: (i) it can participate in the insurance arrangement and not
out-marry or out-migrate, or (ii) it can stay out of the arrangement in which case it will surely be
mobile. Our primary objective is to study the eect of a permanent increase in income for a subset of
households (household 2), as described above, on this decision.
4.3 The Participation Decision
The model is solved in two steps: In the rst step, we solve for each household's expected utility gain
over autarky, or surplus, conditional on participating in the insurance arrangement. In the second
step, households decide whether or not to participate before the arrangement commences, based on
the previously computed surpluses.
We begin by characterizing the set of constrained ecient contracts in a given regime, starting
from a period in which state s occurs, which in turn allows us to compute the surpluses for households
1 and 2, Us, Vs, from that period onward. Households expect the current technology regime to persist
forever. As LTW note, the Markov structure and the fact that ecient contracts are forward-looking
implies that the Pareto frontier will be the same in any period in which the same state occurs. Within















19Coleman's (1988) seminal article on social capital as well as a more recent review of the literature (Portes, 1998)
describe alternative social control mechanisms, among them exclusion, that are used to maintain cooperative behavior.
Both articles emphasize the importance of network \closure" in increasing social interactions and enforcing collective
punishments, noting, moreover, that mobility can threaten the integrity of closed networks. The endogamous jati, of




srr [Ur   Ur] + 
X
r
srr [Vr(Ur)   V r]
where Vs(Us) is the Pareto frontier which solves the problem of maximizing household 2's surplus
subject to giving household 1 at least Us and subject to the sustainability constraints that ensure that
neither household deviates in any future state: Ur  Ur =  P1(r), Vr(Ur)  V r =  P2(r). We ignore
non-negativity constraints on consumption by assuming that the Inada conditions are satised.
The optimality equation matches the corresponding equation in LTW except for the  term, which
reects the additional utility that households outside the arrangement receive from out-marriage and
out-migration. As in LTW, this dynamic programming problem can be shown to be a concave problem,









with the Envelope Condition providing the additional equation
 V 0
s(Us) = : (5)
Dene r   V 0
r(Ur), r   V 0
r(Ur), where Vr(Ur) = V r. As Ur varies from Ur to Ur,  V 0
r(Ur)











r if t < r




r if t > r
The ratio of marginal utilities  in any period will remain unchanged in the next period if it lies
within that period's -interval. If not, it will shift to the nearest boundary of that interval.20 Starting
in the L-regime, suppose that state s occurs in period 1. Using the preceding rule and starting with
a predetermined 0,  and its corresponding s from equation (3) can be derived in period 1. Moving
forward in time,  can be derived in the next period for each state r, with its corresponding r.
20The proof of this result (Proposition 1 in LTW) can be summarized as follows: If t < r it follows that t < t+1
since t+1 2 [r;r]. From equation (4) this implies that r > 0, r = 0, which implies in turn that Ur = Ur. Hence,




, we need to rule out both r > 0 and
r > 0. Suppose r > 0. This implies t+1 > t from equation (4) and, hence, t < r which is a contradiction. A
similar argument rules out r > 0. If r = r = 0, then t+1 = t from equation (4), completing the proof.
18Continuing with this process and accounting for the probability of occurrence of each state, Us, Vs
can ultimately be derived assuming that the L-regime persists forever. The same procedure could be
followed if state s occurred in some period t, starting with t 1 and then moving forward in time to
compute Us, Vs.
Step 2 of the model characterizes the participation decision based on these computed surpluses.
Starting in the L regime, the two households decide whether or not to participate in the insurance
arrangement in period 0. Although they are aware of the possibility that the regime could switch
exogenously at some point in the future, this probability is close to zero and so both households make
their participation decision as if the current regime will persist forever. Recall that this was also the
implicit assumption when computing surpluses Us, Vs in step 1 above. If the technology regime does
change at some time T, then the game restarts and the households decide once again whether or not
to participate.
Let 0
s be the initial distribution of states. Household 1 will choose to participate in period 0 if
P
s 0




sVs  0. Us, Vs are computed in each state s from period 1 onwards as described in step 1,
with  tracing a path over time that starts at 0. When the regime changes in period T, participation
decisions at the end of period T   1 will depend on whether or not
P
r srUr  0,
P
r srVr  0,
where s is the state of nature in period T   1. Ur, Vr will be computed in each state r from period T
onwards, with  tracing a path over time that starts at a predetermined T 1.
4.4 Permanent Income Change and Participation
Given the punishments that are in place, consumption-smoothing transfers will be set so that no
household ever wants to renege once it has chosen to participate. Recall that a household that stays out
of the arrangement can out-marry and out-migrate, boosting its utility in autarky. It is consequently
entirely possible that a household's expected surplus prior to participation will be negative, despite the
fact that transfers conditional on participation are constrained ecient, if the insurance arrangement
provides insucient value. We empirically investigate the stability of a longstanding mutual insurance







sVs  0. Our objective is to study the eect of a permanent income
change on these expected surpluses when they were recomputed in period T  1 at the onset of the H
regime. If a household's expected surplus increased from period 0 to period T   1 it would certainly
19choose to participate. If its expected surplus declined suciently it would no longer participate, with
accompanying implications for out-marriage and out-migration. To analytically compute the changes
in expected surplus we make the following assumptions:
A1. The rst-best was achieved in the L regime: 0 2 [s;s]8s.
Although we make this assumption for analytical convenience, the evidence obtained by Mazzocco
and Saini (2008) for the semi-arid tropics of India and our conservative tests of full insurance reported
in Section 3 make it not unreasonable to assume, as a rst-order approximation, that the rst-best
was achieved in the L regime. Numerical solutions that we report below conrm the main analytical
result when this assumption is relaxed.
A2. The initial  in the H regime is set at the level maintained in the L regime: T 1 = 0.
The initial  determines the distribution of the total surplus between the two households and so
its level clearly aects the participation decision. With the rst-best in particular, 0 determines  in
all subsequent periods and so a large enough decline in T 1 would ensure that the surplus declines
for household 1 in the H regime.
The initial  is determined outside the model by a Central Planner. All members of a sub-
caste were historically assigned to the same occupation. Given that there was relatively little spatial
variation in agricultural productivity with the traditional technology, we would expect to have seen
little permanent variation in household incomes within sub-castes. 0 would then have been set to
distribute the total surplus evenly across households.
Why would T 1 not shift to maintain the surplus of the now richer household 2 in the new
regime? Once permanent income inequality is introduced in the H regime, a shift in T 1 to completely
account for this change would result in a commensurate increase in consumption inequality. Households
with dierent levels of consumption engage in dierent leisure activities. Heterogeneity in the level
(and pattern) of consumption within the jati would thus mechanically lower the frequency of social
interactions, with an accompanying decline in the eectiveness of collective punishments. If these
eects are suciently large, it could be socially optimal to maintain an egalitarian distribution of
consumption despite the negative consequences for participation that we derive below, and setting
T 1 equal to 0 ensures that this will be the case. There is an extensive anthropological literature
that describes the often substantial redistribution of wealth across households in traditional agrarian
20economies.21 Our framework provides an eciency-based explanation for this phenomenon. As we
show below, one implication is that the most wealthy or able members of collective arrangements are
likely to exit rst from them, consistent with prior observations on cooperative groups.22
Under the maintained assumptions A1 and A2, the main result of our model can be stated as
follows:
Proposition 1. Leaving household 1's income unchanged across regimes, let household 2's income
increase by y in each state or, equivalently, in each time period in the H regime. Then the surplus
for household 1 will increase in the H regime if punishment P exceeds a threshold that is increasing
in y.
The proof proceeds in two steps: First, we show that household 1's surplus increases in the H regime
if the rst-best continues to be maintained. Second, we show that the rst-best will be achieved if P
exceeds a threshold that is (weakly) increasing in y.
If the rst best continues to be maintained in the H regime, the following condition must hold in
each state s for any history and for any y:
v0(y2(s) + y + s(y))
u0(y1(s)   s(y))
= 0: (6)








 < 0: (7)
It follows from equation (7) that the per-period surplus for household 1 will be increasing in y
in any state s:
d
dy
[u(y1(s)   s(y))   (1 + )u(y1(s))] =  u0(y1(s)   s(y))0
s(y) > 0:
To assess the consequences of this increase for household 1's surplus starting from state s after any
history, Us, examine the expression




21Scott (1976) is the classic reference in the literature on the \moral economy," but see also Popkin (1979) for an
opposing view.
22Platteau (1997), for example, documents such patterns of exit from cooperative arrangements among Senegalese
shermen and in a Nairobi slum.
21Since the per-period surplus is increasing in y for each state, it follows that Ur will be increasing
in y for all r. Us is unambiguously increasing in y and, hence, increasing from the L regime (with
y eectively equal to zero) to the H regime when the rst-best is maintained.
In contrast, the eect of an increase in y on household 2's surplus is ambiguous.23 To see why
this is the case, rst compute the change in its per-period surplus:
d
dy
[v(y2(s) + y + s(y))   (1 + )v(y2(s) + y)] = v0(y2(s)+y+s(y))(1+0
s(y)) (1+)v0(y2(s)+y):
It is easy to verify from equation (7) that [1+s(y)] 2 (0;1), which then implies from the preceding
expression that household 2's per-period surplus will be decreasing in y for s > 0. Intuitively, in
those states where transfers ow from household 1 to household 2, s > 0, the decline in s with y
will be reinforced by the concavity in the per-period utility function, since household 2's income (and
hence consumption) has increased by y. When transfers ow in the opposite direction, however,
v0(y2(s) + y + s(y)) > v0(y2(s) + y) and so the eect of an increase in y on the per-period
surplus is ambiguous. The decline in s with y implies that the (absolute) ow from household 2
to household 1 will increase, but the concavity in the per-period utility function and the increase in
income (and hence consumption) by y will dampen the negative eect of this increase on household
2's surplus. Inspection of the preceding expression indicates that household 2's surplus, Vs, will
nevertheless decline in all states if  is suciently large and its per-period utility function is not
too concave. Numerical solutions to the model reported below with log preferences show that Vs is
monotonically declining in y despite the fact that  is set to zero. Nevertheless, we will allow for
the possibility that Vs is increasing or decreasing in y in the empirical analysis and the discussion
that follows.
Having established that Us is unambiguously increasing in y, the next step is to show that the
rst-best will be maintained if punishments P exceed a threshold that is (weakly) increasing in y.
Household 1's surplus in any state s after any history is bounded below by
Us = [u(y1(s)   s)   (1 + )u(y1(s))] + 
X
r
srUr =  P1(s); (8)
where s is the maximum amount that household 1 is willing to transfer to household 2 in that
state. Given that Ur is increasing in y for all r, it follows immediately that s is increasing in y.
23This is consistent with previous research which shows that the relationship between relative wealth and participation
in collective institutions is ambiguous (Banerjee and Newman 1998, La Ferrara 2002).
22The assumption that the rst-best was maintained in the L regime implies that s > s with y = 0
in all states s in which transfers owed from household 1 to household 2. Since s is increasing in y
and s was shown to be decreasing in y above, the sustainability constraint for household 1 would
remain slack for all values of y in the H regime when punishments P1(s) are held at the same level
as in the L regime.24
Household 2's surplus in any state s after any history is bounded below by
V s = [v(y2(s) + y   jsj)   (1 + )v(y2(s) + y)] + 
X
r
srVr =  P2(s); (9)
where jsj is the maximum amount that household 2 is willing to transfer to household 1 in that
state. If
P
r srVr is increasing in y, jsj will be increasing in y. The sustainability constraint for
household 2 that was slack to begin with in the L regime will remain slack in the H regime for all
y, with the same level of punishment P2(s) as in the L regime. For the more stringent case in which
P
r srVr is decreasing in y, it follows from equation (9) that jsj will be decreasing in y.
For the rst-best to be achieved, jsj  jsj for all y in all states s in which transfers ow from
household 2 to household 1.25 Consider a state s in which
P
r srVr is decreasing in y. Figure
3 describes the negative relationship between jsj and y just derived for a given P, as well as
the positive relationship between jsj and y, which we showed earlier was necessary to maintain
a constant 0. The downward sloping solid line is associated with a threshold punishment P0
2(s)
that is just sucient to ensure that the rst-best is achieved with y = 0. When we consider a
y to the right of the origin, and continue to focus attention on the solid lines it is evident that
jsj < jsj at that point. An increase in P2(s) increases jsj at each value of y in equation (9), and
so a larger punishment P
2(s) > P0
2(s) is associated with the dashed downward sloping line needed to
just maintain the rst-best with y. It follows from this discussion and is easy to verify from the
gure that the rst-best will be achieved as long as the punishment in state s exceeds a threshold
that is increasing in y. Punishments are determined by the level of social interactions and so will
presumably remain the same from the L regime to the H regime. This implies that the rst-best
24This argument, and the argument we make below for household 2, could alternatively be stated in terms of . s
pins down s, which can be computed by replacing s with s in equation (6). Since s is increasing in y, it follows
that s is decreasing in y. We know that s < 08s to begin with, since the rst-best was achieved in the L regime.
It follows that this condition will hold in the H regime with any y.
25jsj pins down s and so will be the same in all periods in which state s occurs (Vr in equation (9) is part of the
maximization problem and so will be set accordingly). Although jsj could vary over time in general, depending on the
evolution of , it will also be the same in all periods in our case since we focus on the rst-best.
23will continue to be obtained if there is sucient slack in the initial regime, with the required slack
increasing in y.
Do these results hold when the rst-best cannot be attained? Figure 4 and Figure 5 present
numerical solutions to the model for dierent punishment levels, relaxing the assumption that the
rst-best is obtained in both technology regimes.26 The two households smooth their consumption
across three states of nature, s = f1;2;3g. Income realizations for household 1 and household 2,
respectively, in these states are (4,2), (3,3), and (2,4). States of nature occur with equal probability
and are independently distributed over time. The innitely-lived households have log preferences, a
common discount factor of 0.8, and  is set to zero. Punishment levels are common across households
and states.
The Pareto frontiers in the three states will overlap to dierent degrees, depending on the level of
punishment that is chosen. With three states, ve congurations are possible: (i) no overlap, (ii) state
1 overlaps with state 2, (iii) state 2 overlaps with state 3, (iv) state 1 and state 3 do not overlap but
state 2 overlaps with both state 1 and state 3, and (v) each state overlaps with the other two states.
As punishments increase, the Pareto frontier will expand (s declines and s increases), increasing the
degree of overlap. It is evident that only the fth conguration can support the rst-best allocation
with a constant  over time.
To derive the constrained-ecient transfers and, hence, the household-specic surpluses corre-
sponding to a given punishment level, we must rst determine which conguration is in place. Starting
with an initial distribution of the surplus 0,  can only take on one of six values, s, s, s = f1;2;3g
in the future once the sustainability constraint binds in any period. In the discussion that follows it
will be convenient to denote each of these extreme points on the state-specic Pareto frontiers as a
node. With three states, there are six nodes, which we number in decreasing order of household 1's
surplus within each state, running from state 1 through state 3. With this notation, it is straightfor-
ward to derive expressions for the continuation surplus of each household, in any current state and for
any history, assuming that a particular conguration is in place. For example, assuming conguration
1 without any overlap is in place, the continuation surplus for household 1 when state 1 is realized in
the current period and node 1 was the last binding constraint can be expressed as













26We are grateful to Andrew Foster for providing us with the numerical solution. Copies of the program used to
compute the solution are available from the authors on request.
24with the rst subscript denoting the current state and the second subscript denoting the node
corresponding to the most recent binding sustainability constraint. When the previous node is one
and the current state is one, household 1 will achieve its maximum surplus (at node 1) in the current
period as well, since  can maintain its previous level. This is reected in the transfer 11 that
ows to household 1 and the assumption that all the subsequent-period surpluses start from node
1 in the expression above. With three states and six nodes, there are 18 equations of this sort for
each household. The sustainability constraints generate 18 additional equations. For example, the
sustainability constraints for state 1 are:
V11 =  P, U12 =  P, U13 =  P, U14 =  P, U15 =  P, U16 =  P.
This leaves us with 54 equations and 54 unknowns, allowing us to solve for Usn, Vsn, sn, s =
f1;2;3g, n = f1;:::;6g. Once the surpluses are computed in each conguration, it is possible to
assess whether the relative levels are consistent with the degree of overlap in the Pareto frontiers
that is associated with that conguration. For a given punishment level, consistency will only be
achieved with a single conguration. Once that conguration has been identied it is straightforward
to compute the expected surplus for each household, starting with an initial distribution of the surplus
0, given the assumption that states of nature are independently distributed over time. Permanent
increases in income for household 2 with the new technology regime y are easily incorporated by
repeating the entire process with a fresh set of income realizations. Figure 4 and Figure 5 report
the expected surpluses for household 1 and household 2, respectively, for dierent y and dierent
punishment levels P.
We report surpluses with three punishment levels: P = 1=32;1=4;1 and y for household 2 ranging
from zero to one. The rst-best is sustained across the entire range of y with P = 1, and so as
expected from Proposition 1, household 1's expected surplus
P
s sUs is monotonically increasing in
y for that punishment level in Figure 4. Figure 4 also shows, however, that the expected surplus of
household 1 increases as y increases for household 2 even if punishment levels are such that the rst-
best is not sustained. With P = 1=4, for example, although the rst-best continues to be obtained for
y = 0, the slack is not sucient to sustain the rst-best over the entire y range. Once household
2's sustainability constraint binds, the total surplus declines, together with a shift in the distribution
of the surplus away from household 1. Although this unambiguously reduces household 1's surplus
relative to the rst-best benchmark, we see in the gure that its surplus continues to increase in y
albeit at a slower rate. When P = 1=32, the rst-best is never achieved but again the expected
25surplus continues to be increasing in y, although it lies strictly below the level achieved with the
larger punishments and the surplus is much less sensitive to household 2's permanent income change.
Figure 5 reports the corresponding surpluses for household 2. The patterns are essentially reversed,
with the expected surplus for household 2 monotonically declining as its income increases both in the
rst-best regime and in the regimes in which the rst-best cannot be sustained. Thus, when the shift to
the new technology regime induces a permanent change in inequality, the households experiencing the
permanent income gain are the households most likely to choose to exit from the community insurance
scheme. Figure 5 also shows, however, that when the level of punishment that can be administered by
the community is low, ex ante exit by the household whose income has permanently increased is less
likely than when the punishment for reneging within the scheme is high. In general, Figures 4 and 5
show that mobility is less sensitive to permanent increases in inequality within the network the lower
the level of punishment P.
Our model of mutual insurance focuses on how permanent changes in income for a subset of
households within the community aect the integrity of risk-sharing arrangements. In doing so, we
make the standard assumption that there is no storage and no savings.27 Access to credit or a
savings technology will increase the utility of all households in autarky. This is equivalent to an
increase in outside options  in the model, which lowers the surplus of all households. In addition,
it is easy to verify from the expressions for Us, V s, that s will increase and s will decrease as 
grows, reducing the level of risk-sharing that can be sustained and lowering surpluses even further
once sustainability constraints start to bind. Improved access to credit thus can lower participation in
the mutual insurance arrangement even when punishments are in place. In particular, as  increases,
households will exit when their surpluses fall below  P. It follows that mobility is less sensitive to
improvements in outside options the higher the level of punishment P, in contrast with the result
we derived above for changes in inequality within the jati.28 We will exploit this observation in
the concluding section of the paper to interpret the empirical results in the context of underlying
punishment levels and to forecast (out of sample) the eect of new, superior forms of insurance on
27Including these additional features in the model will not aect the comparative statics derived above as long as the
permanent change in income is uncorrelated with changing access to credit and savings. The empirical analysis that
follows pays particular attention to this possibility. Although Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) and Ligon, Thomas, and
Worrall (2000) consider the welfare eects of introducing alternative risk-sharing arrangements, a welfare analysis of this
sort is beyond the scope of the paper.
28There are two reasons for this: First, sustainability constraints will start to bind at higher levels of  when P is
large. Second, the threshold surplus below which the household exits is lower when P is large.
26mobility.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Specication and Identication
The prediction of the model is that conditional on the household's own income, a permanent increase
in its partner's income - the income of the rest of the jati - should increase its propensity to participate
in the insurance arrangement, with an accompanying decline in the probability of out-marriage and
out-migration. Conditional on average jati income, however, a permanent increase in the household's
income is likely to have the opposite eect on participation and mobility.
The stylized model assumes that technological change occurs at a single point in time for all
households and that the permanent components of income instantaneously adjust, following which
households update their participation decisions. In practice, all areas of the country did not benet
immediately from the new High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) of wheat and rice. The early rice HYVs,
in particular, were unsuitable for cultivation in many areas, and it was only by cross-breeding with
local varieties that the new technology could be adopted throughout the country (see Munshi, 2004,
for details). In addition, credit constraints prevented growers from responding immediately when the
HYV technology did become available because complementary investments in irrigation were required
to fully exploit the enhanced potential of the new seeds. Allowing incomes to change over an extended
period in the aftermath of the Green Revolution, with accompanying changes in participation and
mobility, we use the following specication to test the predictions of the model:
Mit = 1yit + 2yjt + it; (10)
where Mit measures the change in household i's participation or mobility between the 1982 and
1999 survey rounds, yit measures the change in the permanent component of the household's income
over the same period, yjt is the corresponding change in (average) income in the rest of the jati, and
it measures changes in the unobserved determinants of Mit. The model predicts 1 < 0, 2 > 0
with the change in participation as the dependent variable and 1 > 0, 2 < 0 with the change in
out-marriage and out-migration as the dependent variables.
Equation (10) eliminates any xed determinants of participation and mobility, such as the house-
hold's risk aversion or productivity, that are unobserved by the econometrician. However, time-varying
27determinants of Mit that are correlated with changes in income must still be accounted for. We fo-
cus on two important determinants of Mit in the discussion that follows: First, as discussed in the
previous section, changes in credit will determine changes in the household's decision to participate
in the mutual insurance arrangement. Second, changes in local public amenities will change mobility
decisions. Changes in access to credit or the quality of local public goods will also determine changes
in income, biasing the estimates of 1 and 2. To obtain consistent estimates of the income eects
in equation (10) we consequently construct instruments for the change in household and jati income
that are attentive to the presence of these time-varying, persistent unobservables. The instrumental
variable strategy we employ exploits (i) technological features of the Green Revolution, (ii) the obser-
vation that initial advantages in income have long-term consequences when credit markets function
imperfectly, and (iii) the availability of both village and household information at the onset of the
Green Revolution for households in the 1982 and 1999 survey rounds.
We make use of three technological features of the Indian Green Revolution: First, only certain
parts of the country had access to the new HYV seeds at the onset of the Green Revolution. Second,
the returns to investing in the HYV technology are much greater on irrigated land. And, third,
the returns to irrigation are much greater using HYV than using traditional seeds. To construct a
parsimonious set of instruments, we make the stronger assumptions that HYV technology can only
be adopted on irrigated land and that cultivating the traditional technology on irrigated land is not
cost eective. Under these conditions, household i endowed with Li units of land and Fi working
members would receive a ow of income in period 0 at the onset of the Green Revolution that can be
characterized by the expression
yi0 = Li( + Si0  HY Vv0) + Fi( + Sv0  HY Vv0); (11)
where Si0 is the share of the household's land that was irrigated in period 0, HY Vv0 is a binary
variable indicating whether the new technology was available in the village in period 0, and Sv0 is the
share of village land that was irrigated in period 0. The rst term in parentheses in equation (11)
is the expected income per unit of land. Given the assumptions made above, households in villages
without access to HYV in period 0 (HY Vv0 = 0) would certainly not invest in irrigation (Si0 = 0),
generating income per unit of land . Access to credit was severely restricted at the onset of the Green
Revolution and so households with access to HYV (HY Vv0 = 1) would have invested in irrigation (Si0)
28to the extent that their resources permitted. The Si0  HY Vv0 term thus represents the additional
income that households with access to HYV received on their irrigated land. The second term in
parentheses in equation (11) is the wage income per adult worker. Following the preceding argument,
 measures the wage in a village without access to HYV (HY Vv0 = 0). Workers are more productive
on (irrigated) land allocated to HYV. The Sv0  HY Vv0 term represents the wage premium that a
worker receives in an area with irrigated land and HYV seeds, with the wage premium higher the
greater the share of irrigated land Sv0.
In an economy with imperfectly functioning credit markets, the additional income that a household
received from planting HYV in period 0 would have allowed it to invest in additional irrigation in the
subsequent period. This process of incremental investment would generate a link between period-
0 income and income in any subsequent period as well as the change in income between any two
subsequent periods. The diusion of the new HYV technology was complete by the early 1980s and
so households in villages that did not have access to HYV in period 0 would ultimately have gained
access to the new technology. However, their investment in irrigation would have commenced at a
later point in time, giving rise to a dierent income trajectory. It follows that yi0, as described in
equation (11), would predict the change in income yit across any two subsequent time periods for
all households in the sample.
Although yi0 may be a strong predictor of yit, it must also be uncorrelated with changes in access
to credit and the quality of local amenities, which are included in it, to be a valid instrument. Some
components of yi0, such as the household's ability to invest in irrigation Si0, will clearly be correlated
with its unobserved access to credit in period 0 and, by extension, to changes in credit if the unobserved
variable is serially correlated. We consequently proceed to extract those components of yi0 { on the
right hand side of equation (11) { that are plausibly uncorrelated with it to use as instruments for
yit.
The rst component of initial-period income is Li, which we measure by the amount of land that
was inherited by the household head, as reported in the 1982 survey. Land markets are extremely
thin in rural India (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993), with households rarely selling o their land. The
2005 IHDS reports, for example, that in the ve years prior to that survey less than 2.75 percent of
all landowning households sold any land to pay o a loan or meet expenses. It thus seems reasonable
to assume that this historically-determined variable is uncorrelated with individual traits, such as
reliability, that determined access to credit in period 0, and was also unaected by credit market
29conditions or the quality of informal networks at that time. Initial land area is mechanically correlated
with changes in wealth, which will determine changes in the household's access to credit and, hence,
changes in participation and mobility. Note, however, that land area only determines these outcomes
through household wealth, which is an important component of our permanent income measure yit
in equation (10), thus satisfying the conditions for a valid instrument.
In contrast with inherited land area, investments in irrigated land Si0 are chosen by the household.
These investments will depend on the availability of credit in the village in period 0 as well as the
household's ability to access credit, which will depend on its wealth as described above and individual
unobserved traits such as reliability. More reliable households will build a reputation with their banks
over time, which implies that Si0 could be correlated with changes in access to credit. To account for
this possibility we replace Si0 with Sv0, the share of irrigated land in the village in the 1971 survey
round, when constructing instruments from equation (11). Burgess and Pande (2004) show that
banking regulations in India led to a convergence in the availability of credit (measured by proximity
to banks) over time. Sv0 would then be correlated with changes in the availability of credit, and so
we will include Sv0 as an additional independent regressor in equation (10).
By a similar argument, HY V0, which is constructed as a binary variable that takes the value one
if any household in the village adopted the new technology in the 1971 survey round, will depend on
agroclimatic conditions as well as whether the district was targeted for early adoption. If districts
that were more open to new technologies and to change more generally were targeted rst, then HY V0
could be correlated with the quality of local amenities in period 0 to the extent that these amenities
were similarly targeted. If the quality of local public goods is serially correlated, then HY V0 would
be correlated with the change in their quality and so we will also include HY V0 as an independent
regressor in equation (10). The only remaining term in equation (11), Fi, reects endogenous fertility
choices that could be correlated with household traits that determine access to credit in period 0 as
well as local public goods (such as health clinics) in that period. Following the preceding arguments,
fertility choices could then be correlated with changes in access to credit and local public goods. We
consequently replace Fi with F, the average across all households in the sample, when constructing
instruments from equation (11).
Collecting all terms in equation (11) and accounting for the modications described above, we are
left with three instruments for yit: Li, Sv0HY Vv0, LiSv0HY Vv0. Instruments for yjt are similarly
constructed by taking the jati-level averages of the household instruments. Once Sv0 and HY Vv0 (with
30their jati averages) are included as regressors in the instrumental variable regressions, we identify the
eect of permanent income changes on participation and mobility from the interaction of Sv0 and
HY Vv0, scaled up by the amount of land inherited by the household Li. The instrumental variable
strategy thus exploits the technological complementarity between irrigation and HYV, allowing for the
possibility that the availability of HYV technology and well developed irrigation facilities in period 0
reect village-level unobservables that persist over time by including them in the second stage. The
identifying assumption is that their joint presence is independent of it. To provide support for
this assumption, we will verify that the instrumental variable estimates are qualitatively unaected
by the inclusion of a large number of village characteristics representing public goods provision or
credit access in 1971 or, alternatively, the change in those village characteristics from 1982 to 1999,
as additional regressors.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
To construct our panel of households, we started with the 1982 households represented in the 1999
survey round. Because of household partitioning, many 1982 household members are distributed
among dierent 1999 households. We thus aggregated any and all the households in 1999 that split-o
from the 1982 households, resulting in a balanced sample of 3,441 households in each of the two years.
To increase the precision of jati-level aggregates, we eliminated all households in jatis with less than 10
surveyed households, leaving us with a balanced two-year panel of 2,341 households. Table 5, Panel
A reports the share of households that participated in the mutual insurance arrangement and the
incidence of out-marriage and out-migration, separately in 1982 and 1999, for the panel sample.
Participation is a binary variable that takes the value one if the household sent or received caste-
transfers (gifts or loans) in the year preceding each survey round. Based on the panel sample, we see
that participation rates declined from 0.23 to 0.15, which is broadly comparable with the statistics
reported for the full sample in Table 1. The measures of out-marriage and out-migration are con-
structed from the 1999 retrospective histories on the marriages and migration of all of the siblings and
children of each household head in the sample. From these histories we created a variable indicating
whether whether any unmarried child of the household head married outside the jati in the 10-year
period prior to each survey date. The measure of out-migration is whether any male aged 20-30 at
the time of each survey and residing in the household prior to the survey date had left the village
permanently by the survey date. Based on these measures, the out-marriage rate increased from 0.05
31to 0.07 and out-migration increased from 0.05 to 0.09 between the 1982 and 1999 survey rounds. As
discussed in the Introduction, mobility remains extremely low in rural India.
The model derives the eect of a permanent change in income within the jati on the participation
and mobility of its members. Income is not usually well-measured in surveys. To verify the robustness
of our results, we constructed two measures of income using independent sets of variables. The rst
measure computes permanent (expected) income as 5 percent of the household's total asset holdings
at the beginning of the reference period (one year before each survey round) plus \full" income - the
village-level daily agricultural wage multiplied by 312 days and the number of adults in the household.
This measure of income thus only varies with contemporaneous common shocks, such as in rainfall,
because of the responsiveness of wages to village-level productivity changes. Our second income
measure is simply the household's reported total income (excluding transfers) in the crop years 1981-
82 and 1998-99, which will also reect household-specic shocks to output, wages and labor supply.
Using these household income measures, we constructed aggregate jati income measures by taking the
sample-weighted average of the incomes of the other members of each household's jati.
It is evident, based on either income measure in Table 5, Panel B that there was considerable
growth in income over the sample period. The wealth-based income measure increases three-fold or
four-fold, depending on whether we use the household or the jati average between 1982 and 1999.
Reported total income, averaged across households or jatis, doubles over this period.29 Although
the means of the two income measures are dierent, the cross-sectional correlation between them is
0.63 and the correlation between their 17-year changes is 0.54. We report income eects with both
measures, but the wealth-based measure is immune to household-specic shocks, which increases the
power of our instruments and will therefore be our preferred measure of permanent income change in
the discussion that follows.
All the instrumental variable regressions include a binary variable indicating whether anyone in
the village used HYV in 1971 as well as the share of irrigated land in the village in 1971 (together
with the corresponding jati averages) as independent regressors. These statistics are reported in Table
5, Panel C where we see that roughly 60 percent of the panel households belong to a village with
some HYV cultivation in 1971 and that 40 percent of cultivated land was irrigated in the sampled
households' villages (comparable numbers are obtained for the corresponding jati averages).
29The household and jati averages for a given income measure do not coincide for two reasons: (i) the household is
excluded when computing average income in its jati, and (ii) the jati statistic is computed using sample weights.
32Robustness checks discussed above will include additional 1971 village characteristics and the
change in village characteristics from 1982 to 1999 separately in the instrumental variable regressions.
Recall that these characteristics are meant to directly predict unmeasured changes in credit and
public goods in the village. The 1971 characteristics include whether the village was situated in an
area covered by the Intensive Agricultural Area Programme (IAAP), whether agricultural extension
service was active in the village, whether the village was covered by the Intensive Agricultural District
Programme (IADP), and whether a bank, school, and health center were present in the village in
that year. These data are obtained from the 1971 survey and we see in Table 5, Panel C that there
is substantial variation in village characteristics in the sample. Changes in village characteristics are
based on the 1982 and 1999 surveys, with these characteristics including the presence of a health
center, whether a bank was located nearby (less than 10 kilometers away), whether there was a public
secondary school, and whether there was a family planning clinic in the village. There is substantial
change in each of these variables in Table 5, Panel C, consistent with the infrastructure improvements
that occurred in rural India in this period. We will see that the included village characteristics jointly
determine participation and mobility in a number of specications. However, the estimated income
eects are qualitatively unaected by their inclusion.
5.3 Participation and Mobility Estimates
Appendix Table 1A reports the rst stage parameter estimates corresponding to each second-stage
specication, with yit, yjt as the dependent variables and Sv0  HY Vv0, Li  Sv0  HY Vv0, Li (with
their jati averages) as the excluded variables. The coecients on Li  Sv0  HY Vv0 (at the jati level)
and Li (at the household level) are positive and signicant across almost all specications and the
F-statistic testing the joint signicance of the excluded variables is large (the p-values are below 0.01)
without exception.
Table 6 reports the instrumental variable estimates for our basic specication, including Sv0,
HY Vv0 (with their jati averages) as additional regressors. Columns 1-3 use the wealth-based measure
of income, while Columns 4-6 use the actual income realization. Because we are instrumenting with
xed historical characteristics, we estimate the eect of permanent (expected) changes in income in
either case. Both sets of estimates support the joint hypothesis that conditional on the household's
own income an increase in jati income increases the probability of participating in the insurance
arrangement and lowers the probability of out-marriage and out-migration.
33With respect to the eect of the household's own income, we noted in Section 4 that a relative
increase in the household's income was likely to reduce participation and increase mobility. Although
the opposite eect could be obtained if the household were suciently risk averse, our simulations
reported in Figure 5 suggested that for all punishment levels a permanent increase in income did reduce
the household's surplus. However, a change in a household's income or wealth (independent of the
inuence of income in the rest of the jati) could directly aect out-marriage and out-migration other
than through network eects.30 Keeping these caveats in mind, we see in Table 6 that an increase in
a household's own income, conditional on its jati income, does have the eect that the model would
generally predict - households with relatively high income are less likely to participate in the insurance
arrangement and are more likely to out-marry and out-migrate.31
Table 7 subjects the results to greater scrutiny by including a number of village characteristics
measured in 1971 as additional regressors in Columns 1-3. In a related test we include the change
in a number of village characteristics from 1982 to 1999 in Columns 4-6. Although these additional
regressors are jointly signicant in a number of specications, the estimated income eects (using the
wealth-based income measure) are very similar to those reported for the more parsimonious specica-
tions in Table 6, Columns 1-3. The pattern of coecients in Table 6 and Table 7 thus provides strong
support for the hypothesized link between participation in insurance arrangements and mobility. The
(conditional) jati eects suggesting that increased jati incomes raise participation levels and reduce
exit, in particular, are dicult to reconcile with alternative explanations of immobility that do not
require a role for the caste network.32
What do the point estimates imply for the eect of economic growth and changing inequality on
mobility? As seen in Table 5, average jati (wealth and wage-based) income increased from Rs. 1560
in 1982 to Rs. 6863 in 1999.33 Because economic growth increases both the household's income and
30For example, illiquid land markets make it dicult for wealthy farmers to migrate, or wealth facilitates the nancing
of migration and perhaps even out-marriage.
31The coecients on household income and jati income with our preferred wealth-based measure in Columns 1-3 are
jointly statistically signicant. The 
2 values are 5.56 (participation), 6.23 (migration), 5.13 (marriage). The associated
p-values are 0.06, 0.04, 0.07.
32Although we focus on caste-based insurance arrangements in this paper, networks organized around the jati have
also historically supported migration in India. If wealthier households are tied more strongly to their rural origins, the
negative jati-income coecient in the migration regression could simply reect the fact that households belonging to
wealthier jatis have access to weaker migrant networks. This alternative explanation, however, would not explain the
negative jati-income coecient that we obtain in the marriage regression as well.
33As noted, the jati gures use sample weights and thus better reect the changes in incomes in the rural population.
The wealth-based income measure is more immune to household-specic uctuations than is realized income and so is
our preferred measure of permanent income.
34jati income, the net eect of an overall increase in income is obtained by adding the own income and
jati income coecients. The summed point estimates in Table 6, Columns 1-3, indicate that the more
than fourfold increase in real income between 1982 and 1999 would have reduced participation by
just 1.0 percentage point (4.4 percent), while increasing out-marriage by only 0.03 percentage points
(5.8 percent) and increasing out-migration by only 0.08 percentage points (16 percent). The point
estimates in Table 6, Columns 1-3 indicate that changes in inequality also do not have strong eects
on mobility. Allowing only jati income to increase, leaving the household's own income unchanged, the
household's participation would increase by 1.7 percentage points (7.5 percent), while out-marriage
and out-migration would decrease by less than 0.6 percentage points (11 percent). These estimates
thus suggest that neither high levels of growth nor large changes in inequality would substantively
increase the historically low levels of mobility in rural India in the absence of other structural changes.
Finally, although the traditional caste networks have evidently been robust to economic growth in
the short run, our estimates do indicate that exit is more likely among the relatively wealthy within
the network, consistent with the mutual insurance model. This selective exit will over time lower
the average income of the network. The estimates of the jati income eect in Table 6, Columns 1-
3 permit an assessment of the eect of this decay in the network on future mobility. The average
jati income in the 1999 round was Rs. 7,000. Picking the jati with at least 20 sampled households
whose average income was closest to that number, we discarded the top 15 percent of households
from its income distribution and re-computed the average income. The re-computed average income
in that jati declined substantially (by 23 percent) from Rs. 9001 to Rs. 6905. This decline in average
jati income, however, would have reduced participation by only 0.7 percentage points (5 percent),
while increasing out-marriage and out-migration by even less - 0.2 percentage points (3 percent and 2
percent, respectively). The extremely small network decay eects suggest that the rural caste networks
will remain rmly in place, and that mobility will continue to be low in the future, unless alternative
arrangements of comparable quality become available.34
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the hypothesis that the persistence of low spatial and marital mobility
in rural India, despite increased growth rates and rising inequality in recent years, is due to the presence
34Alternative arrangements may not have emerged precisely because the caste networks are so eective. Kranton
(1996) provides a formal model that describes this tension between market and non-market institutions.
35of caste networks that provide mutual insurance to their members. Unique panel data identifying
sub-caste (jati) membership and providing information on income, assets, transfers, consumption,
marriage, and migration are used to link caste networks to household and aggregate mobility. The
main empirical result is that conditional on household income, a permanent increase in income in the
rest of the jati increases its participation in the caste-based insurance arrangement, while at the same
time lowering mobility (out-marriage and out-migration).
Although these results connect caste networks to immobility, they do not indicate the extent to
which mobility would increase if an alternative credit arrangement of comparable quality became
available. As noted in Section 4, the viability of traditional collective arrangements in the face of
improved outside options will depend to a large extent on the strength of existing punishments.
Recall from Figures 4-5 that household surpluses were less responsive to internal changes in inequality
once sustainability constraints started to bind. The fact that mobility did not increase substantially
despite the increase in within-jati inequality that accompanied the Green Revolution thus indicates
that there was little slack in collective punishments in the traditional regime. With little slack in
punishments, it follows from the discussion in Section 4 that the caste-based insurance arrangements
should be especially vulnerable to secular improvements in outside options. Although an experiment
that exogenously increased access to insurance in rural India is unavailable, the preceding argument
suggests that networks should be vulnerable to improvements in outside options in other contexts as
well.
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) describe how caste-based labor market networks historically as-
sisted their members in nding well-paying jobs in particular occupations in Mumbai (formerly Bom-
bay) city. They also document restrictions on mobility that were imposed by these networks, and the
historically low out-marriage that is consistent with the presence of such restrictions. Outside options
for the members of these networks improved dramatically with the restructuring of the Indian econ-
omy in the 1990's and the availability of new economic opportunities outside of the traditional caste
occupations. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) showed how these changes led to a substantial increase
in inter-generational mobility.
The same data used by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) also permit an assessment of the resilience
of the urban caste networks, as measured by out-marriage, in the face of these threats to their integrity.
As a basis for comparison, we rst present in Figure 6 rates of out-marriage in rural India for the
children and siblings of household heads over the 1950-1999 period, based on retrospective information
36collected in the 1999 round of the rural survey. We see that out-marriage is less than 6 percent of
all marriages and has remained stable for 50 years in rural areas, consistent with the results reported
in this paper. Figure 7 displays out-marriage rates in Mumbai, based on a survey of school children
conducted by the authors in 2001. To be comparable with Figure 6, the statistics in Figure 7 are
computed using the parents and siblings of the sampled school children. As in rural areas, in the
1970's and 1980's out-marriage in Mumbai was very rare. However, in contrast with the stability that
we observed in Figure 6 for rural households, out-marriage increased steeply over time in Mumbai,
particularly in the 1990's, starting at 2 percent in the early 1970's and reaching as high as 12 percent
by the late 1990's. The urban experience suggests that if the rural caste networks ceased to be salient
because of the availability of new, superior forms of insurance, mobility could surge in rural India in
the future as well. Although such mobility would be growth-enhancing, it is important to recognize
that alternative risk-smoothing mechanisms would not necessarily provide the subsidized insurance to
the poor that is a key feature of the caste network.
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Figure 3: The Effect of a Permanent Change in Income for Household 2 on Transfers
 Table 1: Participation in the Caste-Based Insurance Arrangement
Survey year: 1982 1999
(1) (2)
Households participating (%) 25.44 19.62
Households giving (%) 12.36 5.46
Households receiving (%) 10.19 10.82
Income of senders 5678.92 19956.29
(7617.55) (22578.95)
Percent of income sent 5.28 8.74
Income of receivers 4800.29 10483.84
(4462.63) (13493.68)
Percent of income received 19.06 40.26
Number of observations 4981 7405
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Participation in the insurance arrangement includes giving or receiving gifts and loans.
Participation measured over the year prior to each survey round.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Source:
Bank 64.11 80.80 27.58 25.12 64.61 46.79 62.49 18.78 19.82 46.70
Caste 16.97 6.07 42.65 23.12 13.87 7.82 4.11 19.64 14.24 9.12
Friends 2.11 11.29 2.31 4.33 7.84 6.01 3.33 8.28 7.09 5.38
Employer 5.08 0.49 21.15 15.22 5.62 3.31 0.54 1.11 1.85 1.23
Moneylender 11.64 1.27 5.05 31.85 7.85 20.69 12.82 46.80 53.65 24.67
Other 0.02 0.07 1.27 0.37 0.22 15.38 16.71 5.39 3.35 12.90
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Statistics are weighted by the value of the loan and sample weights.
Columns 1-5 computed using 982 loans receivedin the year prior to the 1982 survey round.
Column 6-10 computed using 12,066 rural loans received in the year prior to the 2005 India Human Development Survey.
IHDS 2005 reports loans received from relatives rather than caste.
Investment includes land, house, business, etc.
Operating expenses are for agricultural production.
Contingencies include marriage, illness, etc.
1982 REDS 2005 IHDSTable 3: Percent of Loans by Type and Source
Data source: 2005 IHDS
Loan type: without interest without collateral
without collateral 
or interest without interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Source:
Bank 0.57 23.43 0.38 0.00
Caste 28.99 60.27 20.38 44.62
Friends 9.35 91.72 3.89 21.5
Employer 0.44 65.69 0.44 10.75
Moneylender 0.00 98.71 0.00 0.27
Note: Statistics are weighted by the value of the loan.
Columns 1-3 computed using 982 loans received in the year prior to the 1982 survey round.
Column 3 computed using 12,066 rural loans received in the 5 years prior to the 2005 IHDS.
IHDS 2005 reports loans received from relatives rather than caste.
1982 REDSTable 4: Test of Full Risk-Sharing
Dependent variable:
Jati sample size criterion: N>=2
Sample: all states all states
non-Hindi 
states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log own-income 0.184 0.207 0.167 0.194 0.241 0.246
(0.045) (0.053) (0.057 (0.051) (0.060) (0.060)
Jati log-consumption 0.873 0.892 0.930 0.716 -- --
(0.04) (0.043) (0.037) (0.071)
Village log-consumption (outside jati) -- -- 0.278 -- --
(0.084)
Negative weather shock -- -- 0.072 -- --
(0.022)
Jati log-consumption (outside village) -- -- -- 0.549 0.608
(0.119) (0.121)
Non-jati log-consumption (outside village) -- -- -- -- -0.212
(0.116)
R-squared 0.782 0.752 0.83 0.771 0.707 0.708
Number of observations 5,061 3,543 2,184 3,501 3,432 3,432
Note: regressions use three years of data 1969-71 for each household.
All regressions include household fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level.
Jati log-consumption is computed without the household itself.
N>=10
all states
log own-consumptionTable 5: Descriptive Statistics, Panel Sample
Year: 1971 1982 1999
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Network Participation, Out-Marriage and 
Out-Migration
Participation -- 0.23 0.15
(0.44) (0.39)
Out-marriage -- 0.05 0.07
(0.19) (0.23)
Out-migration -- 0.05 0.09
(0.19) (0.25)
Panel B: Income variables
Household income (wealth-based measure, 1982 rupees) -- 2175.03 6435.58
(3112.17) (10294.68)
Jati income (wealth-based measure, 1982 rupees) -- 1560.46 6862.75
(1417.23) (12267.58)
Household income (actual, 1982 rupees) -- 7659.59 17815.58
(8110.79) (23787.34)
Jati income (actual, 1982 rupees) -- 6325.13 15133.57
(3760.35) (14463.32)
Panel C: Initial conditions and Infrastructure
    (proportion of households)
Residing in the village  where anyone used HYV 0.62 -- --
(0.48)
Share of village land irrigated  0.41 -- --
(0.38)
Residing in an IAADP district 0.42 -- --
(0.49)
Residing in a village with Agricultural Extension Serv. 0.47 -- --
(0.50)
Residing in an IADP district 0.19 -- --
(0.39)
Residing in a village with a bank 0.09 -- --
(0.29)
Residing in a village with a school 0.92 -- --
(0.27)
Residing in a village with a health center 0.21 0.15 0.25
(0.41) (0.36) (0.43)
Residing in a village with a bank nearby (<10 km.) -- 0.85 0.96
(0.35) (0.19)
Residing in a village with a public secondary school -- 0.40 0.65
(0.61) (0.70)
Residing in a village with a family planning clinic -- 0.03 0.07
(0.17) (0.25)
Standard deviations in parentheses. All statistics are computed using sample weights.
Statistics are computed using households in the 1982-1999 panel.
Statistics computed for jatis with at least 10 households in sample and households with heads at least age 18 in 1982.Table 6: FE-IV Participation, Out-Marriage, and Out-Migration Estimates
Income variable:
Dependent variable: participation out-marriage out-migration participation out-marriage out-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household income -5.20 1.66 2.62 -5.15 2.10 4.07
(6.80) (0.74) (1.72) (9.90) (1.83) (1.86)
Jati income 3.27 -1.11 -1.10 11.00 -2.92 -3.60
(1.39) (0.66) (0.45) (8.37) (1.73) (1.86)
Time trend 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.01) (0.03)
Number of observations 2,335 998 1,049 2,316 994 1,047
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at the state level. All coefficients should be multiplied by 10
-6.
Additional regressors: whether anyone in the village used HYV and share of village land irrigated in 1971 (household and jati average).  
Excluded variables: inherited land, interaction of any HYV and irrigation share, interaction of inherited land, any HYV and irrigation share (household and jati average).
Sample restricted to jatis with at least 10 households in sample and households with heads at least age 18 in 1982.
wealth- and wage-based measure actual incomeTable 7: FE-IV Participation, Out-Marriage and Out-Migration Estimates (with infrastructure variables)
Infrastructure variables:
Dependent variable: participation out-marriage out-migration participation out-marriage out-migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household income -7.68 1.36 2.68 -4.52 1.76 1.85
(7.68) (0.64) (2.25) (6.51) (0.74) (1.83)
Jati income 4.34 -0.97 -1.26 3.50 -1.12 -1.28
(1.88) (0.54) (0.58) (1.37) (0.70) (0.44)
Time trend 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.09
(0.17) (0.02) (0.03) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
Joint sig. of infrastructure variables:
χ
2 4.85 11.12 5.97 15.96 9.27 26.24
p-value 0.43 0.05 0.31 0.00 0.05 0.00
Number of observations 2,335 998 1,049 2,320 987 1,041
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at the state level. All coefficients should be multiplied by 10
-6.
Additional regressors: whether anyone in the village used HYV and share of village land irrigated in 1971 (household and jati average) and infrastructure variables.  
1971 infrastructure: IAADP, IADP, AES, bank, school, health center. 
Change in infrastructure: bank less than 10 km. away, public secondary school, health center, family planning clinic.
Excluded variables: inherited land, interaction of any HYV and irrigation share, interaction of inherited land, any HYV and irrigation share (household and jati average).
Sample restricted to jatis with at least 10 households in sample and households with heads at least age 18 in 1982.
All regressions use wealth-based income measure.



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Anyone in the village used HYV (household) -2787.65 20369.17 265.11 1803.6 -2618.00 21688.62 -3378.44 20365.2
(3719.06) (17642.30) (2608.56) (810.60) (3752.89) (18895.51) (3721.42) (17525.41)
Anyone in the village used HYV (jati average) -3348.87 -42467.91 8859.6 12466.2 -2980.29 -41498.62 -3289.83 -41474.91
(4990.63) (39691.53) (4028.17) (3987.48) (5114.41) (39925.88) (5224.94) (39795.92)
Share of village land irrigated (household) -56.24 5578.18 636.14 1167.55 198.57 4087.9 159.3 6436.22
(4063.92) (9886.26) (3099.13) (1212.10) (4478.07) (6180.60) (3970.31) (10663.09)
Share of village land irrigated (jati average) -4094.89 -22929.07 2285.12 4211.44 -3886.51 -13027.33 -4579.71 -24996.78
(3144.29) (32659.12) (4240.46) (3514.20) (2013.12) (23948.68) (3481.08) (34253.30)
HYV*irrigation share (household) 1844.46 -26942.14 1517.91 -2488.38 576.35 -24266.29 1782.07 -27448.49
(5847.23) (22377.58) (4494.42) (1713.16) (6549.65) (19556.85) (5842.80) (22838.26)
HYV*irrigation share (jati average) -1646.46 24413.53 -10470.36 -11867.65 -1546.83 15127.19 -1678.86 25028.11
(6428.40) (45272.26) (7932.12) (7731.53) (6223.32) (39138.00) (6310.56) (46625.24)
inherited land (household) 3.48 -5.32 3.95 -0.87 3.44 -5.99 3.41 -5.3
(1.12) (4.55) (3.50) (0.44) (1.17) (4.92) (1.12) (4.49)
inherited land (jati average) 6.48 24.11 5.31 15.99 7.96 24.72 4.97 18.92
(7.88) (43.01) (5.47) (7.60) (9.05) (45.61) (7.71) (40.70)
HYV*irrigation share*inherited land (household) 3.44 6.58 2.24 1.38 3.24 9.10 3.71 6.45
(6.06) (14.78) (6.94) (1.71) (6.22) (16.25) (6.11) (14.92)
HYV*irrigation share*inherited land (jati average) 41.09 140.68 21.43 27.58 41.15 131.82 46.42 151.59
(19.56) (37.31) (7.87) (10.45) (19.91) (37.13) (21.68) (41.24)
Constant 8084.81 25683.28 3573.44 -1737.43 12131.81 27469.61 8827.06 28055.6
(2828.20) (20544.49) (3070.46) (2981.01) (2985.38) (20626.17) (3106.47) (22540.73)
initial infrastructure conditions (1971) No No No No Yes Yes No No
change in infrastructure (1982-1999) No No No No No No Yes Yes
F statistic (excluded variables) 104.96 12.28 18.31 10.39 35.16 13.24 84.65 10.12
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.07
Number of observations 2335 2335 2316 2316 2335 2335 2320 2320
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at the state level.
Dependent variables are computed as the change between 1982 and 1999.
Excluded variables: HYV*irrigation, inherited land, HYV*irrigation*inherited land (household and jati average)
Regressions restricted to jatis with at least 10 households in sample and households with heads at least age 18 in 1982.
wealth-based measure actual income wealth-based measure